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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Capstar Radio Operating Company ("Capstar") is the owner of a parcel of property
located in tile Southwest Quarter ofSectioi122, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise
Meridian, located in ICootenai County, Idaho. Defendants Doug and Brenda Lawrence,
husband and wife ("Lawrence"), are the owners of a parcel of property located in the Southeast
Quarter of Section 21, Towtlsliip 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai
County, Idaho. At the time Lawre~lceacquired their parcel, there existed an unimproved road
over, through and across the Lawrence parcel (R p. 01 1, paragraph V; R p. 021, paragraph 5.)
Capstar filed a complaint November 7,2002 seeking ingress and egress to their property under
four alternative tlleories: express easement; i~npliedeasement; prescriptive easement; and/or an
easement by necessity, and seelting ail order of the trial court enjoining Lawrence from
interfering with Capstar's or its tenant's right of use d t h e unilnproved road for access to its
parcel.

B. Course of the Proceedings
This matter has previo~islybee11on appeal before this Court in Ccrpsmr Radio
Operaling Co.

I).

Ln~lrence,143 Idaho 704, 709, 152 1'.3d 575, 580 (2007) ("Capstar P')

seelting reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment finding an express easement
across Lawrei~ce'sproperty. This court vacated the sumlnary judgment and remanded the
matter back to the district court for further proceedings. A relnittitur was filed March 30, 2007.

Followillg remand, on May 14,2007, Capstar renewed its summary judgment motioil

'

on its remaining easerllent theories. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 7-8. On May 31, 2007, Lawrence filed
for a iilotion for an enlargement of time to August 15,2007 to respo~idto the inotion for
surnlnary jr~dglnentbecause Lawrence required additio~laltime to c o ~ l d ~discovery
~ct
in
response lo the iilotion for suninlary judgment. Supp R Vol I, pp. 023-025.
On June 6,2007, Lawrence's couiisel filed a rnotioil to disqrraiify the district court
judge for cause and an applicatioii for an order shortening tiiiie to have the lnatter heard on the
same date scheduled ihr tlie suin~naryjudgment hearing. Supp R Voi. 1, p. 049-54. Capstar did
not object to the request to shorten tiine and the court heard the motioii to disqualify for cause
s e lilotion to disqualify divested tlie trial court ofjririsdiction to
on June 13, 2007. B e c a ~ ~ the
hear other motio~ls,the motion for sunnnary judg~nentdid not proceed as sclieduied. Supp Tr
p. 4, p. 5. On June 25, 2007, the trial court issued a written decision denying the nol lion for
disqualification for cause. Supp R Vol I, pp. 066-091. A~notioiito reconsider was filed July 9,
2007, as well as ~notioiifor perinissio~ito appeal. Supp R Vol. I, p. 92-93. AII order deiiyiiig
this liiotioil was entered august 7, 2007. Supp R Vol. 11, p 338-339.
011 July

24, 2007, Lawreiice filed another motion for el~largeliieiitof tinie to November

1,2007 to respond to Capstar's inotion for sumiiiary judgment, again iildicatiilg additional time
was required to conduct discovery. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 127-129. The motion was heard August

I

The Clerk's Record on Appeal in Docket No. 35120 was ordered prepared as a supplemental record. Althougl?
not designated as a si~ppleme~ital
record by the clerk, to avoid conriision with t l ~ cClerk's Record in Docket 32090,
the record following rema~idand pi-epared for Docket No. 35120 will be rererred to a Si~ppR in this brief

7, 2007. The trial court granted the motion for e~llargementof time and contin~iedthe summary
,judgmeilt hearing.
On November 27, 2007, the trial court again heard 1,awrence's renewed niotion to
appeal the trial court's denial of Lawrence's motion for ail interlocutory appeal of the denial of
the motion to disqualify the trial judge for cause. Supp T r p. 133. The summary judgment was
heard November 28,2007. Tlie trial court denied the motion to proceed with an interlocutory
appeal on Noveiuber 30,2007. Supp R Vol. 111, pp. 548-552.
On December 17, 2007, Lawrence filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with this
Court. The motion was denied by this Court January 17, 2008. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 343-344;
Voi. TI, pp 553-554..
The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment 011 February 6, 2008. This appeal followed.

C. Stateme~~t
of Facts
In their statelnent of the facts, Lawrence discussed a conditioilal use permit granted to
Nextel Communications. This conditio~ialuse perniit is unrelated to Capstar or its parcel of
property. Capstar submits that the relevant facts to the issues on appeal are those set forth
hereafter.
In 1968, Pilie and Agnes Rey~ioldssold Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and
Viola Marcoe several parcels of property, including the Southeast Quarter of Section 21,
Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in ICooteiiai County, Idaho and tile
adjacent So~itliwestQuarter oE Section 22, Tow~lship50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian,

located in Icootenai County, Idaho except for a one acre parcel which had previously been
conveyed to General Telephone Company ("GTC"), subject to easements granted to GTC over
and across the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and the Southeast Quarter of Section 21.
Appeal Exhibit Weeks Affidavit, exhibit "A".

In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk ("Funk") entered into a purchase agreement with
Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and Viola Marcoe which included a sale of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in
ICootenai County, Idaho (hereafter "Section 21 ") and the adjacent Southwest Quarter of Sectio~l
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai County, Idaho
except for the one acre parcel which had previously been conveyed to General Telephone
Company in 1966 (hereafter "Section 22") and s~ibjectto the GTC access easement. Appeal
Exhibit Weclts Affidavit, exhibit "B";R p. 035. A subsequent 1974 warranty deed from
Raden Raden and Marcoe to F~lnltconveyed the Section 21 and Section 22 property subject to
easements of record. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "C". At the times Funlcs
purchased the property in 1969, the GTC easement road was the only existing road providing
access to the Funit's real property. R. p. 036.
When Pilcc and Agnes Reynolds granted GTC its parcel in 1966 in Section 22, they
included in the deed an easernent over and across the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and the
Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, Icootenai
County, Idaho. Appeal Exhibit Weeits Affidavit, exhibits "V" and "FF" (Exhibit A to Wenlter
Affidavit). GTC also obtained an easement from Glen and Ethel Blossorn, husband and wife

,over the Southwest Qrrarter of Sectioil 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian,
Kootenai County, Idaho. Appeal Exhibit Weeks Afiidavit, exhibits "V" and "1°F"(Exhibit B to
Welllter Affidavit). GTC also obtained an easement for ingress and egress to its parcel across
the North Half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 28. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit,
exhibit "X". Thus, GTC had recorded easements over the entire easement road to its parcel.
In 1972, Funk purchased an easement from Wilbur Mead to cross his property in the
Southwest Quarter of Section 21. R Vol. 11, pp. 367-368 (Tr p. 43, L1. 22-25; p. 44; p. 45, p
46, Ll.); Appeal Exhibit Lawrence Affidavit, exhibit "F" . There was a gate on Mead's
property. The gate was loclied. In 1992, GTE sent Funk a new ltey to the gate on the Mead
property. R Vol. 11, p. 363, LI. 9-25)
In 1975, Funk segregated and sold the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. a
Minnesota corporation. The sale was evidenced by a recorded Sale Agreement. This
agreement indicated that the sale was subject to and including ingress egress easement over this
and adjoining property in said sectioils 23 and 22 owned by Ft~nli.Appeal Exhibit Weelts
Affidavit, exhibit "E".I11 1977, a Meinorandi~molContract was recorded evidencing the sale
of the Lawrence parcel to Don and Fern Johnstoi~,husband and wife, and Jollil and Mary Ann
McIHugh, husband and wife. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "F", In 1987, a
Memorandum of Sale Agreement was recorded evideilcillg the sale of tlie Lawrence parcel to
National Associated Properties, Iilc. Appea1 Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "G". In June
1996, National Associated Properties, Inc. conveyed tlie Lawrence parcel to Arlnan and Mary
Jane Farmanian, husband and wife. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibits J and I<. A

Memorandum of Sale Agreement between Arnian and Mary Jane Farmanian and Lawrence was
recorded October 1, 1996. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "L".A warranty deed for
this transfer was recorded August 27, 1998. Appeal Exl~ibitWeeks Affidavit; exhibit "P".
Doug Lawrence provided a depiction of the access road in a deposition taken in
litigation with Verizon Nortllwest (GTC's successor in interest) which he testified further
defined the easement that was granted to GTC in 1966, and was apparently a portrayal of the
road prepared in 1967 by GTC as a detail of the access road to its parcel. Appeal Exhibit
Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "Y" and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit "Y". Exhibit 15 portrayed the
GTC road as coi~linencingat a county road and passing in northeasterly direction through
Section 21, then taliing a sharp turn southeasterly into Section 28, then changing direction to
the northeast again and entering Section 21 again for a short distance and continuing generally
in a northeasterly direction through Section 22 to its terniinus at a tower site. A recorded
survey of a portion of the access as it existed over and across Section 28 and the Southeast
Quarter of Section 21 was placed in the record which was consistent with the depiction of the
GTC easement road offered by Lawrence in his deposition. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit,
exhibit "2".This road was depicted by GTC's successor in interest, Verizoil Northwest, Inc.,
on a U.S. Geological Survey Map as comliiencing at the public road (identified on the U.S.
Geological Survey map as "Slti Lodge Road") and traversing across the Southwest Quarter of
Sectioil21, tile11 traversing over and across into the East Half of the Northeast Quarter of
Sectiotl 28; then passing tllrough the Lawrence parcel; and terminating in the Southwest
Quarter of Sectioll 22 at ail area identified on the U.S. Geological Survey map as "Radio

Tower" ail Blossom Mountain. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "FF" (Exhibit C to
We~llcerAffidavit). This depiction was very similar to Lawrence's depiction of the road in
course, direction and configuration of the road, and the sections over and across which it
passed.
In 1989, Funk segregated and sold the Capstar parcel to ICootenai Broadcasting, Inc
("I<Brn). John Rook was the president of I<BI. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibits " Q
and "R", R p. 027. In October 1993, as part of a banltruptcy proceeding, a quit claim deed
conveyed ICBI's interest to Rook Broadcasti~lgof Idaho, Inc. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit,
exhibit "S". 111 November 1998, Rook Broadcasting conveyed the property to AGM-Nevada,
L.L.C. Appeal Exhibit Weeks Affidavit, exhibit "T". In November 2000, AGM-Nevada,
L.L.C. conveyed the property to Capstar. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "U".
In 1992, Funk sold his remaining Section 22 property to John Mack. Appeal Exhibit
Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "11".
Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian executed the Meinoranduin of Sale Agreement with
Lawrence on October 1, 1996. On September 20, 1996, i~urnediatelyprior to signing the
Lawrence sale agreement, Arman and Mary Jane Farinanian entered into a luut~ialagreen~ent,
grant of easement and quit claiin deed with John Mack collcerning their respective parcels.
This agreement recited in relevant part that "AND WIIEREAS, MACI< and MAGIC'S
predecessors in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the n-~ostsoutheasterly
portion of the FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the MACK PROPERTY. This
private road is sometiil1es known as Blosso~nMountain Road (hereinafter referred to as the

"ACCESS ROAD"). For illustrative purposes only, the approximate location of t l ~ eACCESS
ROAD is depicted as a double dashed line on the Exhibit B, attached liereto and incorporated
herein by reference. Exhibit A is an enlargemeiit of the United States Geological Survey
topograpliical map of the subject area." This agreement referred to the access road as the
historic location of tlie access road in inore tlian one location. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Afildavit,
exhibit "EE". The attached exiiibit "B" to the Farmaniail/Mack agreenlenl deed depicted the
road using a similar U.S. Geological Survey map that Wyiin We~iker(Verizon Nortliwest)
utilized to portray the GTC road as it existed in the Soiitheast Quarter of Section 21 across the
Lawrence parcel and into Section 22 to the radio tower site. Appeal Exliibit Weeits Affidavit,
Exhibit "F" (exhibit C to We~ilcerAffidavit). Thus, Farmanian and Mack recognized the GTC
easement road as the historical access road being used by Funk and his successor, Maclt.
Harold Funk testiiied

iii

his 2004 affidavit that when lie purchased tlie property, the

easement road that was used to access the property was the same road over whic1.i GTC had a
recorded access easement. R p. 034-047. Consistent with his ~ffidavit,Mr. Funk testified in
his deposition in August 2007 that tlie access road he used wliel~first loolti~igat tile property
was the W E (General Telephone and Electric) access road. R Vol. 11, p. 36 (Tr p. 18, L1. 1013). There was one gate on the road. R Vol. 11, p. 361 (Tr p. 18, LI. 25; p. 19, L1. 1-1 1). Mr.
Funlc and the realtor drove to the GTE facility using tlie access road. R Voi. 11, p. 361 (Tr p.

19, Ll. 15-25; p. 20, Ll. 1-8.) When Mr. Funk passed over the property he didn't own he
thoiight he a right to do so based upon the Mead easelne~ithe obtained. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 370
(Tr p. 53, L.2 5; p. 54). In the six year period before seili~igthe Lawrence parcel, Funk went to

the property 20-30 ti~neshimself to target practice and pick huclcleberries. Supp R VoI. 11, p.
363 (Tr. p. 25, LI. 11-25; p. 26, LI. 1-5). Funlc bought the property for investlnent purposes.
Stipp R Voi. 11, p. 359 (Tr p. 12, L1. 15-17).
When Funk visited the property, he used the GTE road and went to the GTE tower site.
R Vol. 11, p. 370 ('rr. p. 53, L1. 1-24). Mr. Fui~lcconsidered ope~linga road to tile east, but
someone told him he couldn't do it. R Vol. 11, p. 371 (Tr. p. 58, Ll. 11-25; p. 59, Ll. 1-2).
John Roolc, the president of Icootenai Broadcasting, 111c ("I<BIn), testified in his 2004
affidavit that I<Bi purchased the Capstar parcel froin Funit to operate a wireless radio tower.
east of the parcel were other tower parcels, including GTC.
Mr. Raoli indicated that f~~rtller
Rook testified that wheil KBI purchased the property, it used the saine easement road that
corulected from the public road, Signal I'oini Road (identified oil tile map as "Slci Lodge
Road"), to the GTC parcel. R pp. 026-033.
In his deposition talcel1 August 2007, Mr. Rook indicated that he wanted to purchase a
site at the to11of Blossoin Mountain to upgrade a radio station identified as ICCDA. Sulsp R
Vol. 11, p. 402 (Tr p. 9, 11. 11-24). Mr. Rook testified the purchase was in 1988 or 1989. Supp
R Voi. Ii, p. 403 (Tr p. 10, 1,1. 19-25; 11. 1 1, Ll. 1-22). Whe11 Mr. Rook loolted at the property,
there was only one road to the top of Blossotn Mountain, which was being used by CJTE to
acces its parcel. Supp R Vol. IT, p. 404 (Tr p. 15, Ll. 18-23; p. 16, L. 25; p. 17, L1. 1-21). Mr.
Rook recollected that there was one chail? link gate on the road and another gate positioll
approximately one-half mile away, in the proximity of a sturdy fence, where a gate had once
bee13 in place. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 406 (Tr p. 22, L1. 17-25; 11. 23, L1. 1-9; p. 24, Ll. 15-17).

There were no signs on the access road identifying it. Mr. IZook referred to this road as the
"mail1 road" and the GTE site was at the elid of the access road. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 412 (Tr p.
48, LI. 19-25; p. 49, LI. -1-19). Travelers 011 the road were inoilitored by Wilbur Mead. Supp
R Vol. 11, p. 406 (Tr p. 25, L1. 24-25; p. 26; p. 27, L1. 1-4). Although Mr. Rook could not
identify the sectiolis through which the road passed, he coiifir~nedthat Exhibit C to his &davit
loolted lilte the configuralion of the road as he recalled it. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 417 (Tr p. 67, LI.
17-25;p. 68,Ll. 1-13)p.418(Trp. 70,Ll. 13-25).

In Mr. Roolc's deposition, Lawrerice's coulisel suggested there was another entry into
the GTE site which was Melliclc Road. In response, Mr. Iioolc rejected this proposition, noting
that he had once heard there was a goat's trail that was uilbelievabiy steep corning up the Post
Fails side of the mountain that. couldi1't provide access even

ill

good weather. Me never Itnew

of any other road even though he loolted around for other access roads to the site because the
access road they were usiiig was terribly bulnpy. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 413 (Tr p. 50, Ll. 12-25; p.
51-52; p. 53, L1. 1-8; ) p. 415 (Tr p. 60, Ll. 7-23). GTE took KCDA's engineer up oil their
Siiow Cat usiilg the same GTC access road during major snow storins. Supp R Vol. I1 p. 414
(Tr p. 54, Ll. 9-22).
During the tell years that I<CDA used the road, they regularly bumped into other people
from the neighboring tower sites on the road and no one ever ti~entioi~ed
an alter~lativeaccess.
Supp R Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr p. 62, LI. 26-25; p 63, L1. 1-18). Mr. Rooit indicated that he had
receiitly beeti to Spolca~ieand loolted up the side of Blossorn Mountain, and there were now

roads on the mountain, but tiley were not there during his ownership of the Capstar parcel.
Supp R Vol. 11, p. 50 (Tr . 50, Ll. 12-25; p. 51, LI. 1-5).
KCDA received approval in 1991 or 1992 to broadcast fi-orn the Capstar parcel. Supp R
Vol. 11, p. 409 (Tr p. 35, LI. 7-1 1). There was an engineer who went up to the site at least every
two to three weelts to do maintenance and sometin~esevery week. Supp R Vol. TI, p. 408 ('Tr p.
32,T-1. 4-17; p. 38, LI. 23-25; p. 39, Ll. 1-2). ICCDA continued to broadcast until Mr. Rook
(Rook Broadcasting) sold the tower in 1998 or 1998. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 410 (Tr p. 41, 1.,l. 1022). Mr. Rook testified that the companies that he owned (ICBI and Rook Broadcasting) used
the GTC road for the ten years they owned ICCDA. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr p. 62, L1. I I 25). Mr. Rook also leased tower space to Trinity Broadcasting the last five to seven years that
his coinpany owned the tower site. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr p. 63, Ll. 19-25; p. 65, LI. 4-8;
LI. 18-23). ICCDA operated concurrently with Trinity Broadcasting. Supls I? Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr
p. 65, LI. 18-23).
Mr. Rooli also testified that during the years he owned the tower, "we used to pass
people all the time on that road, somebody coming in or going out, they were working on this
or that." Supp R Voi. 11, p. 418 (Tr p. 72, Ll. 18-20). Mr. Rook testified that they would pass
someone else on the road "Fairly frequently", some of whom were with GTE . Supp R Voi. 11,
p. 418 (Trp. 73, LI. 24-25) p. 419 (Tr p. 74, L1. 1-16).
On the north face of Blosso111Mountain (which is south of l'ost Falls, Idaho), there is a
public road know11 as Mellick Road wllich was laid out by Viewer's Report in 1907. Appeal
Exhibit Lawrence Affidavit, exhibit C. This road as laid out terininated in the Northeast

Quarter of Section 21. The Mellicli Road right of way is within the jurisdiction of Post Falls
Highway District and been maintained for a short distance into Section 15. Brownsberger
Affidavit (augmented on appeal).

On March 24, 2004, John Maclc prepared an affidavit in this matter which was
subn~ittedas an exhibit to Lawrence's affidavit in ol~positionto tile original inotion for
sulnnlary judgment in 2004. Appeal Exhibit L,awrence Affidavit, exhibit "L". Mr. Maclc
testified that

ill

1992 he purchased property in Section 22 from Funk. Mr. Mack testified that at

the tinle he purcl~asedthe property, he inquired aborrt access and the realtor told him he knew
the way. Mr. Mack testified in the Spring of 1994, he was stopped by Idaho Forest Industries

("IFI") and informed he did not have legal access across Section 28, and IF1 demanded he
cease traveling across Section 28. Mr. Maclc testified his Section 22 property was landlocked
as a result of this circumstance because there was no other access road to the Section 22
property. Mr. Maclc indicated that as late as 1996, he was attempting to obtain easements to
access the Funlc properly. Mr. Mack testified that

iil

2002, he purchased property from Fred

Zuber in the East half of the Northwest % of Section 22 (property never owned by Funk) to
develop an access to the north of the Section 22 property.

11. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review

The Court of Appeal recently reiterated tlie standard of review in a case to be tried to
the court. I11 .Johnson v. McPhee,

Idaho

,

P.3d -(Ct. App. 2009), tile court

stated:

On review of an order granting s u l ~ ~ i ~ ijudgment,
ary
this court uses the
same legal standard as that used by the trial court. l;i.ieltJ.Boise City House.
Al~rh.,126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994); Washington Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Lash, 121 Idaho 128, 130, 823 P.2d 162, 164 (1 992). S u ~ ~ i i ~ i a r y
judgment may be entered oiily if "tlie pleadings, deposition, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 110genuine issue as to
ally material fact a ~ l dtliat the ~novingparty is entitled to judgment as a lilatter of
law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See also Avilu v. Wahlquisl, 126
Idaho 745, 747,890 P.2d 33 1, 333 (1995); Idaho Bldg Conlraclors Ass 'n v.
Ciry of Coez~rd'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 742, 890 P.2d 326, 328 (1995). Wlien a
suinliiary judgment lnotioil has been supported by depositioiis, affidavits or
other evidence, tlie adverse party niay not rest upon the inere allegations or
denials of tliat party's pleadings, but by affidavits or as otherwise provided iii
the rule, illust set h r t h specific facts showing that there is a geuuine issue for
trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). See also G a r h e r v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925,929,719 P.2d
1185, I1 89 (1986). In order to survive a rliotioil for suiuiliary judgllleilt the
plaintiff need not prove that an issue will be decided in its favor at trial; rather, it
must simply siiow that there is a triable issue. G & M Fari~isv, Funk Irrigation
Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991). A illere scilltilla of evidence
or o11Iya slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to witlistai1d sunimary
judgment; there must be s~rfficieritevidence up011which a j~rrycould reasonably
return a verdict for the party opposing surnlilary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark
Equip Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1 986); Pelricevich v.
Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,368 (1 969).
When a court considers a nlotion for surnmary judgment iri a case that
would be tried to ajury: all facts are to be liberally construed, aiid all reasonable
inferences iiiust be drawl1 in favor oftiie party resisting the iiiotioi~.G & M
Fari7is, I 19 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854; Sci17der.s 1). lltin~i.Joint School Disl.,
125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). The rule is different
however when, as here, a jury trial has not bee11requested. In tliat event, because
the couri would be the fact-finder at trial, on a suriililary judg~lleiltmotion the
court is elltitled to draw tlie i~iostprobable inferences from tlie ulidisputed
evideilce properly before it, and iiiay grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of coliflicti~lginfereiices. P.O. Ven~ures,Inc. v. Louclc,~Fai7zily
IrrevocaOle Trusr, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007); Inrerinountain

Forest Mgnzi., lnc. 1).L,ouisian.a Paciyc Corjl., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 3 1 P.3d 921.
923 (2001); Broivn 12. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191,923 1'.2d 434,436 (1996).
Infereilces thus drawn by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the
record reasonably supports them. Shawver v. HucltleDerry E~states,L. L. C., 140
Idaho 354,360-61,'); P.3d 685,691-92 (2004); lnternzozinlain Foresi Mgnzt.,
Inc., 136Idahoat236,31 P.3dat924.

B.

The District Court did not Err in Finding there was an Implied Easement

In Akers

1).

D.L. While Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005), this Court

held:

A party seelting to establish ail inyslied easement 1.0111prior use "must
demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and
subseque~ltseparation by grant of tlie doininant estate; (2) apparent contilluous
use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use
was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasoilably
necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe doiniila~ltestate." Davis, 133 Idaho at
642, 991 P.2d at 367.
Creation of easements by implication rests upon exceptioils to the rule that written
iilstrumeilts speak for thei~~selves,
and because i~lipliedeaseivents are contrary to that rule, the
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 Idaho 396,400,422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966); Cord~)ellv.

Smith, 105 Idaho 71,77,665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An easement is iirlplied because
it is presuined that if an access was in use at the tiille of severance it was meant to continiie

Bob Dai?iels undSons v. Weaver: 105 Idaho 535, 542, 681 P.2d 1010, 101 7 (C1. App. 1984).
Easeillents by inlplication rest on the view that land should not be re~~dered
unfit for use due to
a lack of access. Id.

Apparent co~lti~luous
use refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would
indicate the roadway was intended to provide permanent access to tile parcels. Cordwell, 105
Idaho at 78,665 P.2d at 1088. The party seelting to establish the easement has the burden of
providing the facts to establish the easement. I d , 105 Idaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087. 111 Davis v.

Peacoclc, 133 Idaho 637,641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), this Court held that successors
in interest to the original grantors of property could assert easement rights by implied or prior
use
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior use. All
that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999);

Thomas v Mudsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006). IZeasonable necessity is something
less tila11 the great present necessity required for a11 easement iniplied by necessity. Davis, 133
Idaho at 642. Furthermore, the easement by iinplication is not extinguished if the easement no
longer exists or is no longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643. This Court noted in Davis:
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when sonleone
conveys property, they also intend to couvey whatever is required for the
d s retain all that is
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and i n t e ~ ~ to
required for the use and enjoy~nentof tile land retained. Coilsequeiltly, an
easeineilt implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent duration, rather
than a temporary easement which exists only as long as the necessity continues.
See, e.g., Norken. v. McGnhan, 823 P.2d 622,631 (Alaslta 1991); Thon?pson v.
Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1138, 1145 (1979); Slorj) FIefi~ei,,540 P.2d 562,
566 (Oltla.1975). Additionally, all iniplied easement by prior use is appurtenant
to the land and therefore passes with all subsequent conveyances of the
doillinant and servient estates. See i-Juglies 11. Slnre, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397
(1958); I.C. S: 55-603 (staling that a transfer of real property also includes all
easements attached to the property).
IJ.

1) Unily of Title

Lawrence contends that the GTC road passed through Section 28, and since Funk never
had title to Section 28, Capstar can not establish the unity &title necessary for an implied
easement. Capstar does not seek to establish in this suit an implied easement over Section 28.
This argument is not relevant to tlie issues before the trial court.
Lawrence also contends the district court erred in finding that Capstar l ~ a dan implied
easement because Capstar's parcel was still a part of Funk's Section 22 parcel at the time of
separation of the Lawrence parcel. However, a transfer of real property i~lcludesall easements
appurtenant, including implied easements. Davis v. Peacoclc, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d
362 (1999), I.C. 5 55-603. Thus, the trial court did not err when it held Cpastar had an implied
easemeilt arising from the 1975 severance.

2) A p ~ ~ u Coniinuou~
~m/
Use
Lawrence contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it found that tlie facts
presented a1 summary judgment established apparent continuous use long enough before
separation of the doillinant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent. Lawrence
argues on appeal that Funlts deposition testiinony established that Fulllc only used a portion of
Blossom Mouiltain Road to access land owned by Funk lying in the Southwest Quarter ofthe
Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 .

In actuality, Funk's affidavit and deposition testimony were clear that Funk used the
existiug GTC road to access his property in Section 22 and that he drove to GTE's tower site in
Sectior~22 when he used the road to access his property, illcluding passing through Sectioil 28

to get to the top of Blossom Mountain. R Vol. 11, p. 369 (Tr p 52); p. 370 ('Tr p. 53). However,
there was a discrepancy at Mr. Funk's deposition regarding the location of Blossom Mountain
as compared to the map exhibits being provided Mr. Funli during his deposition. Mr. Funk
indicated to Lawre~~ce's
counsel that the nlap he was being shown (Exhibit I ) was different
than his recollection of the road and it wasn't drawn right, and tllar the rnotintGn (Blossom
Moiintain) was "up here" and had the tower site. Lawrence's coiinse! response Lo this concern
about the top of the mountain being "up here" was, "Yeah, you owned some land in 22, sure.
Yeah, oltay." Supp R Vol. 11, p. 368 (Tr p. 45, L1. 7-25; p. 46, L1. 1-14). Later, 1,awrence's
counsei presented an eularged portion of the tilap that Mr. l'unli had indicated was not drawn
right. In aslcing questions about the road, Lawrence's couiisel prefaced his statements with a
representation that Blossom Mountain was in Section 21. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 369 (Tr p. 49, LI.
18-15, p. 50, LI. 1-4). Nonetheless, Mr. Funk's deposition testiniony was clear and co~~siste~lt
that he used the GTC road to drive to GTE's tower site to access his property in Section 22.
This matter was to be tried to the trial court. As sucli, tile trial court was allowed to
draw probable inferences from the undisputed facts before it. Lawrence s ~ ~ b n l ithat
t s the trial
court erred in drawing the probable inference tl~atMr, Fiunk used the GTC road to access his
Section 22 property. The undisputed fact before tile trial court was that Mr. Funk used the
GTC road and traveled it to its ternlinus at GTE's tower site on several occasions to access his
property in Section 22. The probable inference given Mr. Fnnk's columents at deposition
regarding the inaccuracy of the maps and adoption of two different nlaps as accurately
depicting the road he used, in conibination with his unwaivering testimony that he used tlie

GTC road to travel to the GTE site was he used the GTC road for access to his property in
Section 22. Thus, the trial court's ruling that there was continuous use prior to separation was
supported by substantial evidence, including the probable inference the trial court drew froin
the evidence provided by Mr. Funk.
Finally, Lawrence argues the trial court coinnlitted error because it did not find the
probable inference draw an inference in their favor from the evidence presented that Funlc's use
was l~ardlyenough for anyone to notice. In support of this claim, Lawrence directs this Court
to a statement from Wilbur Mead illat to his Itnowledge, Funlt did not use the gate on the road
as it crossed his property in the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 between 1966 and 1972.
Additionally, Lawrence argues Funk sold to a Minnesota corporation that would hardly have
ltnowledge of Funlc's use. Lawrence also contends that the fact that after the sale to Fluman
Synergistics, Funk relocated to Aberdeen and didn't use the road after 1981 is significant.
Tile events that occurred after the sale to I-t~nlianSynergistic were immaterial to the trial
court's inquiry regarding the use o'tlie access prior to the severance. The only fact that was
relevant was Mr. Mead's statement that lo hi.^ k n o ~ ~ l e d gFeL I did
I ~ ~not use the gate on his
property. I-Iowever,this fact does not directly contradict Funk's testi~ilonythat he did use it. It
was merely a scintilla of evidence that neither contradicted nor directly disputed Funlc's
testimony. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that the undisputed facts it had before,
includiiig Funk's testimony; the Farii~aniangrant of easement to Mack in 1996 recognizing the
access road as the historical access to the site; the I-Iunlan Syl~ergisticsSales Agreeinent
(Lawrence's predecessor) wl~ichindicated that the existing ingresslegress road was the access

to tlie Section 22 property retained by Funk; and tlie use of the road which was consistent with
the use and location of tlie property, established ilpparent co11tinuoususe. Supp R Vol. 111, pp.
561-565.
3) Reusonable Necessily
Lawre~lceargues that the district court erred

iii

finding there was reasoilable necessity

for the easement at the time of severance of their parcel. Lawrence maintains that tile
undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that Mellick Road extended to the Funk property in
Section 15. 111footnote 15, Lawrence contends that F~unkidentified a loggiilg road fro111
Section 22 to Mellick Road in Sectio1115. Tl~us,I.,awrence co~icludesthat there was access to
the Section 22 property at the time FLIIII<purcliase Sectio1122 by connecting the logging road
from Section 22 illto Section 15.
The following is an illustrative depiction of the properties in questio~iutilizing a
Kooteiiai Couilty 11ublic road map fom the Brownsberger affidavit.. The properties Fuillts
originally acquired are higlilighted in yellow. The red x's on the luap illustrate the approximate
locatioii of Melliclt Road (along the creek) as laid out by the Viewer's Report for Mellick
Road.

In his deposition, Mr. Funk testified that there was a logging road in poor shape on the
east side of Blossom Mountain. Contrary to the claims of Lawrence to the contrary, the facts

in the record show that the logging road was not open all the way to Mellicic Road at the time
Funk purchased Section 22, and crossed property not owned by Funlc. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 371 (

Tr 61, Li. 8-25; p. 62; p. 63,l-1. 1-1 5). The Exhibit provided Mr. Funlc during his deposition
portrayed a road going through the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, ~ n t othe Northwest
Quarter of Section of22, and crossing over into the Northeast Quarter of Section 21 (in areas
not enconlpassed in the Viewer's Report of the Mellick Road pi~blicright of way) and back into
Section 15. Therefore, the portion of the road depicted in Exhibit I to Funk's deposition laying
in the Southeast Qt~arterof t l ~ eNortheast Quarter of Section 21 was not on property o\vned by
Funk. Mr. Funk further testified that this road was in poor shape. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 360 (Tr p.
15, LI. 6-25; p. 16, Ll. 1-6). Mr. Funk testified contemplated talting a bulldozer and opening up
the logging road but did not pursue this idea because another property owner told him he
couldn't do that. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 371 (Tr p. 58, Ll. 1 1 -25; 12. 59, L1. 1-6).
Further, the trial court's finding that Mellicli Road did not provide access ill 1975 was
corroborated by John Mack's testimony (provided by Lawrence) that there was no alternate
access road existing at the time of his purchase of the Funk Sectio~iproperty in 1992. The trial
facts that the use of the access road was
court did not en. when it found fi-om these u~~disputed
reasonably necessary at the time Funlc severed the Lawrence parcel.
Mr. Funlc testified the GTC road was the oilly road that provided access to Section 22.
Mellicli Road as laid out on the Viewer's report teriuinated in the Northeast Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter (approximately) of Section 21 Thus, the undisputed facts before the trial
court were that Mellick Road did not provide access to Funk's Section 22 property at the time

he purchased; nor did the logging road provide access, nor did Funk have the right to extend tlie
logging road to connect to the public riglit of way across property lie did not own. To reach the
coi~clusionLawrences urge, Funk would had to have bulldozed the road to open it; crossed
property that wasn't owlied by Funk and over wliicli Funk had been told he better not do it.
Lawrence iucluded an argument on appeal that Fui?k never showed the Capstar parcel to

Mr. Rook in 198land that Mr. Rook could not identify whose land tile road crossed. These
arguments are irrelevant to the issue of reasonable necessity at tlie time of severance of the
Lawrence parcel in 1975
Further, the trial court's finding that Meliick Road did not provide access in 1975 was
supported by John Mack's testimony that there was no alternate access existing at the time of
his purchase of the Firnlc Section property in 1992. The trial court did not err when it foui~d

kern these undisputed facts that use of the access road was reasoi1abiy necessary at the tiliie
Ful~ksevered the Lawrence parcel

C. Tlie Trial Court did not err in Pinding an Easement by Necessity
An easernelit by necessity has some similar elements to an easement by prior use. The
Court in B&,I Development & Inv.,Inc.

11.

Pnrsons, 126 Idaho 504, 887 P.2d 49 (Ct.App. 1994)

rioted:
To establish ail easement by necessity, the clailliant luust prove the followiiig
elements: (1) tliat the do~iiinaiitparcel and the servieiit parcel were once part of a
larger tract under comliio~iownership; (2) tliat the necessity for the easement
claimed over the servient estate enisred ni ihe time qflhe severcmce; and ( 3 ) the
present necessity For the claimed easement is great. MucCaskill v. Ebbert, 112
Idaho 11 15, 11 18,739 P.2d 414,417 (Ct.App. 1987) (emphasis added). Ail
easelnelit by necessity is a creature of public policy. Boil Daniels (i: Sons v.

Weaver, 106 Idalio 535, 543, 681 1'.2d 1010,1018 (CtApp. 1984). Therefore, the
easement does not depend on an express mutual agreement. Rather, it arises,
and will be recognized, when the three required elelueiits have been established.
Establishn~entof an easement by necessity is not defeated by a contrary
expectation harbored by one of tlie parties. MacCasIcill, 1 12 Idaho at I1 19, 739
P.2d at 418. It is a question of law. An owner of property, however, cannot
create the necessity by his or her own actions. C a r d ~ ~ ev.l lSinith, 105 Idaho 71,
80,665 P.2d 108 1, 1090 (Ct.App. 1983).
Lawrence argues the trial coui? erred in determining that there was an easement by
necessity. Lawrence concludes Funk argues b e c a ~ ~ Funk
se
did not have a recorded easement
across Section 28 that they had no legal access to the county road, and therefore the trial court
could 1101 grant an easement by necessity,
In Hughes

11.

Fishei-, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231-1232 (2006) it was stated:

This Court has quoted with approval tlie following analysis of the theory
behind easements by necessity:
A way of necessity is an easement arising fro111 an implied grant or
implied reservation; it is of common-law origin and is supported by the rule of
sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or
s~~ccessful
cultivation .... It is a universally established principle that where a
tract of land is coiiveyed wliicl~is separated from the liigliway by other lands of
the grantor or surrounded by his lands or by his and those oF third persons, there
arises, by implication, in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the
premises of the grantor to the highway. Burley Brick and Sand Co. v. Cqfer,
102 Idaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1166, 1 168 (1 981) (qtloting 17A Anz..lur.
Ensei~zentsj'58 (1957)); see 25 An?../z~r.ZdEosentenls nnd Licenses jS30-31
(2005).
One who clainls an easement by necessity across another's land iilust
prove "(I) unity of title and subsequent separation oftlie dominant and servient
estates; (2) necessity of the easement at the time of severance; and (3) great
present necessity for the easement." Bear Islund Wciier Ass'n, Inc. 1~.Broi.l~n,125
Idaho 717,725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994).

The fact that there is a third party (the Section 28 owner) between Capstar and the public
highway is of no significance to Capstar's right to seek an easement by necessity.
Lawrence also co~ltendsthat Funk created his own necessity by failing to recognize,
develop and utilize Mellick Road during the time he owned Section 22 prior to transferring it to
Capstar's predecessor. This argument is the same argument Lawrence made regarding the
reasonable necessity ele~nelltfor an easement by implication. Again, there was no evidence in
the record that Mellick Road provided access to Funk's Section 22 parcel or that Funk had a
right to open a road across property he did not own. Thus, the necessity for the easement
claimed over the Lawrence parcel existed at the time of the severance.
As to great present ilecessity, Lawreilce does not contend that there is a rriaterial dispute
of fact regarding this element, or that the trial court drew an improbable inference. Rather, they
argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to recognize that Capstar created its
own necessity for an easement through the actions of its predecessor. Lawrence claiins that
Funk chose not to develop an access route down to Mellicic Road (across property he did not
own) that Capstar can't claim a great present ilecessity. This is yet another arguruent that the
~lecessitydid not exist at the time of severance. It does not present this Court with any facts
that there is not great present necessity for the road. In fact, Lawrence presented the trial court
evidence to the contrary in Mr. Mack's afidavit.

That affidavit ackilowledged when he

purchased in 1996 tilere was no access, and to obtain access to Mellicic road, he had to purchase
it and develop it through a neighboring property in Sectioil 22. Capstar has no legal right to
travel over Mack's private road. Thus, it has great present i~ecessityfor the easement.

D. The Trial Court did not Err in Determining there was an Easement by
Prescriptio~~
Tile standards for estahlisl?ment of a prescriptive easement were reiterated in Akers,

supra at 206, as follows:
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must
prove by clear and convincing evidence use of tile subject property, whicll is
characterized as: ( I ) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3)
adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or intputed knowledge of
the owner of the servient tene~nent(5) for the statutory period." I1Todgii?s, 139
Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973. The statutory period in question is five years. I.C. 5
5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698, 8 P.3d at 1241. A claiina~ltmay rely on his
own use, or he "may rely oil the adverse use by the claimant's predecessor for
the prescriptive period, or the claima~~t
ntay cornhine such predecessor's use wit11
the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five contii~uousyears of adverse
use." hod gin.^, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents
proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterriipted use of the clainled right for
tile prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he raises
the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v.
Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03,963 1'.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Mcrrshc~llv.
Blair, 130 Idalto 675,680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Tlte burden then shifts to
the owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreeineitt. Wood, I31 Idaho at
703, 963 P.2d at 386; A4mshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The nature of
the use is adverse if "it runs contrary lo tile servient owner's claims to the
property." ITodgins, 139 Idaho at 23 1, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of rite
users of tile alleged easement is not c o ~ ~ t r o i l ithe
~ ~ gfocus
;
is on the nature of
their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 1'.3d at 975-76.
Lawrence correctly notes that the trial court made an error in its ruling regarding the
prescriptive period as applied to Fiink. The trial court correctly noted that in loolting at the
prescriptive period it was required to examine the six year period following Funli's sale ofthe
Lawrence parcel to I-I~imanSynergistics. Funk owned the entire parcel for a six year period
from 1969 to 1975. After selling theLawrence parcel, he personally used the road from 1975

to 198 1, another six year period. The trial court discussed the six year prescriptive period as
being from 1969 to 1975. It is clear the trial court became confused regarding the years
encompassed in the six year prescriptive use period. The evidence in the record before the trial
court was that after 17iovingto Aberdeeil in 1975, Funlt only visited the property two or three
times and stopped visiting a f e r 198 I or 1982 when lie was diagnosed with cancer.
However, this defect in tlic Court's analysis regarding tlie time period of I2uiik's use
does not invalidate the trial court's finding that there was a lsrescriptivc easement established
over the property. The trial court held the undisputed facts establislied tliat Funk's successors
used the road openly, continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right much longer
than the statutory period required. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 576.
Lawrcilce argued to the trial court tliat the undisputed facts established that Capstar's
use ofthe access road was based upon permission they granted. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 571.
Relying on Alcers v. D. L.White, supra, the trial court also correctly held that tlie only period of
time for which Lawrence could give permission was the period of tiine during their ownersliip,
which commenced in 1996. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Lawrence submitted
an affidavit that since talting title to the land, he iiiai~itai~ied
a loclted gate on his property,
stopped and turned back people who~iilie deemed could not demonstrate a legal right to use the
road, and actively attempted to engage the sheriff uffice to get their support in limiting use of
the road. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 572.* Lawrence argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law
in fiiidiilg tliat Fuiilc and its successors use of the road was not permissive. Lawrelice raises two
Tile affidavit referenced by tile Lsial coi~rlis in llie record at Supp R Voi. I , pp. 146-293
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theories in support of this contention. Lawrence contends the trial court should have
determined that the use was permissive hased upon the fact that there was common use with the
owner of the servieut estate and based upon the fact that Lawrence's parcel was wild,
u~lenclosedor unimproved.

Lawrence did not raise the wild, unellclosed or uninlproved

theory below, and should not he allowed to raise it on appeal. Further, Lawrence cites to no
facts in the record to support this contention.
Lawrence argues on appeal that the trial coul.t erred by failing to rule it was entitled to a
presumption that Capstar's use was permissive based upon public use. I11 support of this
argument, Lawrence cites to Marshall v. Bluir, 130 Idaho 675,679, 946 P.2d 975,979 (1997).
The Marshull court held tl~atwhen the origin of use of an easeiuent is ~~nl<nown,
there is a
presumption of adverse use. The servient estate can rebut this presuiinption by presenting
evidence of general public use.
The origin of the use of this easement is Icnown. It coii?menced on purchase of the Funk
property and continued after severance. Even if Lawrence were correct, the trial court held that
the undisputed facts established Funli's use was not permissive. The trial court correctly noted
that after Flunk sold the property to Human Synesgistics in 1975, lie recorded the sales
agreement which contained the clause that the parcel was subject to an ingressle,oress easement
for the benefit of Section 22. Even though this language did not reserve an express easement, it
evidenced a claim of right for Flu~kand their successors to use the road for ingress and egress
to Section 22, and was recorded in the real property records. The trial court co~lcludedthat this

document established that the use of tlie ease~ne~it
by Funk and his successors was under a
claim of right.
Even if these facts allowed rebuttal of the of the evidence, the record is devoid of any
facts presented by Lawrence that the easement is used by the general public. To the contrary,
Mr. Lawrence's affidavit testimony was that he loclced the gate on the road on his property and
did not allow the public to use it. It was also uildisputed that the access road was gated and
loclted as it crossed Wilbur Mead's property arid keys were given to Funk and Roolc to use the
road. These undispi~tedfacts show the road was not used by the general p ~ ~ b l i c .
Lawrence asserts that the trial court co~n~nitted
error when it did not draw ail iuference
of permissive use from the fact that Wilbur Mead's gate in the Southwest Quarter of Section 21
was loclted and keys were provided to Funk and Rook. Funlt had an easement across Mead's
property. Mead did not impede this right, even though he used a gate and lock to impede others
horn using the access road. A legal right is not a permissive right. Tile trial court did not err
when it did not draw an iiifereiice that a legal right was a permissive right.
Lawrence cite to Hughes v. Fisher, 124 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006) ibr the
proposition that there is no prescriptive use in tlie present case. 111Hughes

1).

Fisher, the court

reiterated the general 1.u1ethat the regular crossing of another's property was pxesurued to be
adverse with the exception where a landowner constructed a way over tlie lalid for his own use
and convenieilce, the mere use of it by others that doesn't interfere with his use will be
presumed per~nissive.

In this case, there is no evidence that Lawrence or his predecessor constructed the road.
In the present case, tilere is evidence that the road existed at least around 1967 when GTE
prepared a road profile of it. It certainly existed when Funk started using it, and it existed when
Roolc started using it Thus, the trial court had no basis to presume that the use by Funlcs and
others has been pcrn~issive.Lawrence did not present evidence in support of its laches claim
sufficient to prevent entry of sunnnary judgment.

E. The Trial Court did not Err in Rejecting Defendants' Laches and Statute of
Limitation Claims
Defendant argues on appeal that Capstar was required in its conlplaint to allege that it
would be relying upon easement rights established by its predecessors in iiiterest in order to
proceed with its suit. Lawrence presents no case law or argument why this statement supports
a claim of laches.

Further, as pointed out by the trial court, Capstar's complaint did allege

Capstar and its predecessors in title had used Blossoin Mou~ltainRoad as it crossed the
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real properly openly, notoriously,
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceedi~zgfive (5) years. Supp R
Vol. 111, p. 578.
Lawrence also cl~allengesthe trial court's finding that there was no evidence in the
record that the doctrine of laches sl~ouldnot apply.

011appeal,

Lawrence claiins tliey were

prejudiced because the severance occurred nearly 33 years ago without any filrther explanation
or argiin~ent.This argument was not presented to the trial court. Further, the facts on appeal
show that Lawrence had an opportunity to depose botli Funk and Rook. It is difficult to

ascertain the prejudice Lawrence claiiiis to have suffered. Further, Lawrence acltnowledges in
its brief on appeal that the catalyst for the prcsent suit occurred when Lawrence began bioclting
the road. Thus, Capstar had no need to defend its legal rights until Lawrence hloclted its use of
the access road.
Althougl~contailled in its caption, Lawrciice did not present argiinient on the statute of
li~nitationdefense. This Court has consistently indicated it will not consider assignments of
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Jorgen.son v. Coppedge,

-,

-Idaho

181 P.3d 450 (2008).

F. The Trial Court did not Err in Striking Portions of Lawrence's Affidavits
Lawrence contends the trial court erred in strilting portions of their affidavits while
leaving intact those affidavits subnlitted by Capstar. This allegation is not correct. The trial
court did strilte portions of Capstar's affidavit. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 349-351.
Deslsite this general co~nplaintregarding the anlount of illaterial submitted and stricken,
Lawrence presents no case law or argument why thc trial court abiised its discretion Again,
this Court should not consider this iss~icon appeal absent being presented argument and legal
authority.
G. The Trial Court did not Cotnmit Error in Granting a Sixth Access to its Parcel
Pursuant to a previously entered order, the trial court entered an order allowing Capstar
a sixth access to its parccl. In a preliminary injunction order entered at the outset of this case in
2002, the trial court granted Capstar four accesses to its property, and required all future

accesses be approved through application to the court. 011October 29,2007, Capstar filed an
application for a sixth access pursuant to the Court's previously entered order.
Lawrence claims it was error for the court to allow the sixth access pursuant to the
previously entered order. Without any cite to law, Lawreilce argues that because a perinalleilt
i~ijuilctioilwas entered at the c o n c l ~ ~ s i oof
i ~the
s first summary judgment on express easement,
it nullified the preliminary i~ijuilctionorder. There simply is no case aw presented in support of
this argumeilt.
Lawrence clailiis the court should have required a bond. In Miller v. Board of Trustees,
132 Idaho 244,247-48,970 P.2d 512, 5 15-16 (1998), this Court held that a bond is required
unless the trial court maltes a specific finding based upon competent evidence that 110such
costs, damages or attorney fees will result to the restrained party as a result o f a wro~lgful
issiiing of the i~~,juiiction
or restraining order. The trial court made such an order based upon
the facts of the case. Supp Tr pp. 153, L. 25; 154- 155; 156, L. 1-23

EI. The Trial Court Properly Considered and Ruled Upon Lawrence's Motion to
Disqualify for Cause
Lawrence devotes a large portioii of his brief to the argument that the district judge
should have disqualified himself. Lawrence claims the trial court's imparistality could
reaso~lablybe questioned.
111support of this argumeiit, Lawrence claims tliat over the course of the litigation, they
perceive the judge disregarded meritorious argumellts made by them. They also cite to the fact

that the judge disqualified himself without cause in a former case involvillg their legal co~msel
at the time (John Whelan).
Lawrence also argues that the fact that the court took the motion under advisement and
then issued a written opinion was a clear indicator that the court was no longer impartial and
had a stalte ill the proceedings.
Lawrence also talces umbrage with rulings with which it disagrees in this case and the
case with Tower Asset. Lawrence claims that r ~ ~ l i n gfavorable
s
to Capstar deinonstrate that the
district judge is "just a tool of these corporations."
Finally, Lawrence claims that the evidentiary rulings inade on motions to strilce display
the district judge's prejudice against tl.ie~n.I-Iowever, as noted above, Lawrence cite to no
evidentiary rule of case in support of the claim that the trial court committed error in striking
portions of their submitted affidavits. On suinniary judgment, a trial court is only allowed to
consider admissible evidence. Posey v. Ford Molor Credit Co., 11 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App.
2005).
The trial court issued a thorough opinion that enunciated its reasons for denying
Lawrence's notion for disqualification for cause. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 66-91. This meinoranduln
sets forth the reasons the trial court refused the motion and clearly addresses the concerns
raised by Lawrence on appeal. Lawrence has raised nothing on appeal that was not addressed
in the trial court's decision except for the evidentiary rulings. Further, the evidentiary rulings
made by the trial court were supported by the rules of evidence.

Lawrence requests attorney fees on appeal because they perceive Capstar to be part of a
large corporate conglomerate. This request does not comport with LA.R. 41. Lawrence does
state that Capstar was not justified in pursuing summary judgment. To the extent that this
could be deemed a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. 12-121, Capstar has not pursued tits
defense of this appeal frivolously.

IV. CONCLUSION
SUBMITTED this 5" day of May, 2009.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

SUSAN P. WEEKS
Attorneys for PlaintifflRespondent
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